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INTERNET POINTS OF CONTROL
JONATHAN Z	 IN *
Abstract: The online availability of pornography and unauthorized
intellectual property has driven Internet growth while giving rise to
efforts to make the Internet more regulable. Early efforts to control the
Internet have targeted the endpoints of the network—the sources and
recipients of objectionable material—and to some extent the
intermediaries who host others' content. Recently, attention has shifted
to the intermediaries near would-be recipients of content. The U.S.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania permits its attorney general to obtain a
court order requiring ISPs to block Pennsylvanians' access to Internet
locations designated as containing illegal pornography. If successful,
this approach could be employed for other regulatory purposes, such as
controlling the online distribution of comight-infringing materials.
While the Pennsylvania law suffers from a number of technical
limitations and constitutional vulnerabilities, with some adjustments to
Internet architecture and data carriage practices this approach could
become a comprehensive scheme for widespread content control that
overcomes a number of enforcement barriers and jurisdiction-related
objections.
INTRODUCTION
Pornography is said to be among the earliest and most popular
uses to which new media are put.' The mainstream development of
the global Internet carries on that tradition, augmented by the unau-
thorized swapping of proprietary material. Empirical data are difficult
to acquire, but. if a packet were randomly plucked and parsed front
the data flowing through the Internet's backbones, chances are good
that it would be a piece of something prurient, pilfered, or both. 2
*Jack N. & Lillian R. Berkman Assistant Professor for Entrepreneurial Legal Studies,
Harvard Law School, I thank Terry Fisher, Megan Kirk, Molly Shaffer van Houweling, and
participants in the University of Pennsylvania Legal Studies Workshop for insights on ear-
lier drafts, and Peter Sand in the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office and Craig Silli-
man at WorldCom for very helpful discussions.
1 Peter Johnson, Pornography Drives Technology: Why Not to Censor the Internet. 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 217, 217 (1996).
2 Sec Vomit, PORNOGRAPHY, AND 'ME IN'ITRNET 72 (Dick Thornburgh & Herbert S.
Litt eds., 2002) ("Compared to the totality olcontent on the public World Wide Web, adult
oriented sites account for a relatively small fraction (about 1.5 percent). However, these
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If the overlapping categories of pornography and intellectual
property drive public Internet use and growth, they have therefore
also created the most powerful pressures to make the Internet and its
users more "regulable." Originally designed by academics for quick,
cheap and perfect data copying and sharing—without inquiry or
worry about its nature, or that of the people on either end of a given
transfer—the Internet's architecture has prominently stymied control
efforts by those allegedly harmed by its less innocuous uses, If one
were to randomly pick a case from a typical cyberlaw course or case-
book front within the past few years, chances are good that it would
concern attempts to penalize or prevent something prurient, pilfered,
or both. 4
Attempts to control the Internet have met with mixed success
amid a vigorous and ongoing debate about the extent to which the
comparatively anarchic status quo will prevail. 6 I wish to add to that
debate—in which I believe that control will trump anarchy—by exam-
ining a recent experiment in control launched by the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania to restrict the flow of illegal pornography available to
its. residents. This experiment, grounded in a state law by which any
Internet service provider OSP), under threat of criminal liability, can
be required to block access by Pennsylvanians to a given Internet des-
tination. 6
 The law represents a novel approach, heretofore untried by
both anti-pornography champions and their conceptual sibling-in-
arms publishers seeking to limit intellectual property piracy.
sites account for a significant amount of Web traffic. According to industry statistics, ap-
proximately 70 million different individuals per week view at least one adult Web site on a
global basis „ „").
3
 See LAWRENCE LESS1G, TUE FUTURE OF IDEAS 178-79 (2001).
4 See generally, e.g., RAYMOND S. R. Ku E•1' AL., CYBERSPACE LAW (2002) (over 70% of the
cases involved pilfering or prurient material); MARK A. LEMLEY yr AL., SOFTWARE AND
INTERNET LAW (2000) (80% of the cases in the Internet law portion of the book involved
pilfering or prurient material); PETER B. MAGGS ET AL., 2002 SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNET
AND COMPUTER LAW (over 60% of the cases involved pilfering or prurient material).
5 On the side of anarchy: see generally, for example, David R. Johnson & David Post,
Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace. 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367,1375 (1996); Sympo-
sium, Fundamental Rights on the Information Superhighway: Keynote Address, 1994 ANN, SuRv.
An. L. 355; John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994. On the increasing
emergence of control, see generally, Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory
Standards and the Future of the Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 2 (1999), available at http://
www.lawberkeley.edn/journals/btlyarticles/voll4/Lessig/html/text.html.
6 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7330 (2002) (Section 7330 was repealed by 2002, Dec. 16,
P.L. 1953, No. 226, Section 2, but it was replaced by an essentially identical set of statutes.
18 PA, CONS. SIM'. §§ 7621-30 (2003)).
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The experiment is notable for its audacious departure from the
Internet's techno-political foundations. It enlists network service pro-
viders in a role that has previously—surprisingly, in retrospect--com-
pletely eluded the crossfire documented in the courses and case-
books. It is also notable because, after a string of efforts resulting in
something far short of total effectiveness, it portends a strategy that
will work. ISPs can serve as Internet police, not only cordoning off
areas from view when acting as hosts of content, but also more
broadly restricting access to particular networked entities with whom
their customers wish to communicate—thus determining what those
customers can see, wherever it might be online. The publishers,
themselves no strangers to creative and cutting-edge (if so far some-
what hapless) approaches to taming the Internet, are no doubt watch-
ing closely, and will endeavor to adapt this sort of progress on anti-
pornography, should it succeed, for use in their own battles.
A refined Pennsylvania approach—reinforced by the technical
tools developed by ISPs conscripted to accommodate it—could cause
a sea change in the Internet's regulability. Such a change would bring
Internet usage in line much more closely with prevailing legal stan-
dards, whether concerning dissemination and use of pornography or
intellectual property, or relating to other persistent problems like
gambling, Spain, privacy infringement, or conflicting jurisdictions.
Those who bewail such a change will have to frame their objections
persuasively and show that those objections are truly fatal to the adop-
tion of the general strategy of client-side ISP filtering. By sorting the
Internet's brief but intense history of content, control struggles into a
framework of points of technical intervention along a canonical
Internet data path, I will explain why the Pennsylvania approach is a
significant departure from prior attempts at regulation and explore its
desirability should it become commonplace across a range of regula-
tory purposes. I conclude that although the current implementation
will prove unwieldy, a few adjustments to Internet architecture and
common practices of data carriage could usher in a comprehensive
scheme far more amenable to widespread content control both tech-
nically and as a matter of fairness to those censored.
I. A TAXONOMY OF NETWORK CONTROL APPROACHES
To understand the most recent approach in the struggle for
Internet regulability and its relation to previous tactics, it is important
to understand the technical path between two points of communica-







Figure le Abstraction of Internet Protocol wide area point•to•oint data transmission
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and protocols see to it that data from a user at one "point of pres-
ence"—typically a computer—can find its way to another such node
and corresponding user through a series of often distinct intermedi-
aries.
Figure 1 shows an abstraction of the path followed.?
Each point of presence on the Internet is assigned at least one unique
number—an IP address. That address might be more or less perma-
nent ("static") or assigned only for the duration of that computer's
short-lived connection to the Internet ("dynamic"). Dynamic ad-
dresses occur most frequently where a computer is attached to the
Internet through a dial-up modem connection. A packet of data is
passed from the computer whose user created it, with a label indicat,
ing that source computer's IP address, to the computer's ISP. Typi-
cally each computer has only one ISP, which initiates the packet's
journey from the computer to its destination and returns any packets
labeled for that computer's IP address. The packet's destination is
also identified by its particular IP address.
Most ISPs themselves have ISPs—smaller ISPs can either be resel-
lers of a larger ISP's service or simply have one or more "transit" al --
7 See generally DOUGLAS E. COMER, 1NTERNETWORKING WITH TCP/IP VOLUME 1: PRIN-
CIPLES, PROTOCOLS, AND ARCHITECTURES (4th ed. 2000) (field's classic text detailing ill-
tern etworking) •
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rangements by which other ISPs agree to pass packets back and forth
to the smaller ISP and its customers. Thus Figure 1 includes several
overlapping rings where ISPs are concerned, indicating the Matr yo-
shka doll-esque structure of concentric packet-passing that often takes
place at either end of a packet's travels.°
Such multiple hops are usually necessary because Internet data
typically moves in short physical fits and starts, front one router to the
next along a chain that ultimately ends in a destination. Simplifying
somewhat, it is as if one attempted to reproduce the functions of a
country's paper postal service without the use of a postmaster general
or accompanying fleets of trucks. Rather, one living on the south side
of an east-west street might simply examine the contents of one's
mailbox and do one of four things: first, take mail addressed to one-
self inside the - house; second, take any mail for any westward destina-
tion—whether three houses down or miles away—and walk it to the
mailbox one house to the left; third, take any mail for any eastward
destination and walk it. one house to the right; and fourth, take mail
for any northward destination and walk it across the street. So long as
all homeowners act similarly, even paper mail could be moved in
rather staggered fashion across the country one home dweller at a
time.
At some point in the path ISPs do not pass packets upward to still
larger ISPs. Instead, like the neighbors in the postal mail example,
they "peer" with other (often like-sized) ISPs, passing packets laterally
when one of the receiving ISP's customers (or customer's customers)
appears to be linked to the computer at. the packet's indicated desti-
nation. A receiving ISP then passes the packet to the relevant client
ISP, or, if at the end of the chain, to the destination computer itself.
Such peering takes place, in technical terms, within the "cloud," or
colloquially, the "middle" of the Internet, where smaller networks
come together to logically construct the single Internet.
Thus we Might think of typical movement of data on the Internet
as having five distinct phases. It begins at (1) a source, passes through
(2) the source ISP, continues through transit. and/or peering through
(3) the cloud, is handled by (4) the destination ISP and then arrives
at (5) the destination. Of course, some journeys are short enough—
they might take place between users of the same ISP, for example—
that not every step is taken. Even if all the steps are involved,
8
 One can watch a report of the path a packet takes from one's computer to a given
destination through the use of "traceronte," usually abbreviated as "tracert" in Windows
environments.
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not every step is taken. Even if all the steps are involved, conceptually
different phases might still be handled by the same firm. Also,
"source" and "destination" are more symmetric network entities than
they sound—each is simply a point of presence for the exchange of
data, and, unlike television or radio broadcast, both Internet users
and Internet servers are in the business of habitually exchanging data.
Either one might be the "source" of a given transfer between the
two—the Internet user for sending a signal corresponding to a mouse
click indicating which file is desired from the server, and the Internet
server for offering up the file to the user. Here I take "source" to
mean a server or supplier of information on the Internet—either a
high-traffic server designed to accommodate many requests for in-
formation (e.g., the computers behind nytiines.cona), or an individual
Internet user who has configured his or her computer to supply data
to others (e.g., a user of the Gamella file sharing network who has
accepted that program's default of making some of the user's files
available to others). I take "destination" to be an individual user of
the Internet who requests and receives data from a source.
Each phase of a packet's travels is usually invisible to the users on
both ends of a communication; the Internet's point is to make such
basic data movement as automatic and involuntary as breathing. Thus
neither computer users nor software developers typically need to con-
cern themselves with the details of Internet routing. However, efforts
to restrict data flow to limit the transmission of pornography, illegally
copied intellectual property, or other undesirable content can be best
understood and evaluated bearing such routing in mind. Routing is
critical because the phase at which control is attempted is one of the
most important factors contributing to a given control strategy's
strengths and shortcomings as matters of both engineering and pol-
icy.
Within the U.S. legal framework, not only must the data in ques-
tion be properly labeled "contraband," such as where its possession or
transmission could be legally actionable, the entity targeted for legal
action must have been properly asked to prevent the data's transfer or
use. Various barriers to practical enforcement of any legal require-
ment also exist. Those seeking to block the illegal content must pres-
sure the entity within the chain of data transfer whose selection
maximizes the chances of both legal responsibility and successful en-
forcement.
20051	 Internet Points of Cant pal 	 659
A. Asserting Control at the Source
The source of a data transfer is a natural locus at which to belay
that transfer. Indeed, this naturally happens every time a given point
of presence on the Internet erects a password barrier or other firewall
to allow some but not all users to access data within the source's files.
Those running the servers that make particular data available online
are in the most direct position to stop its distribution should they
wish—or be compelled—to do so. Furthermore, the source of a
communication is almost always most clearly and directly legally re-
sponsible for its distribution, at least compared to those further along
the transmission chain. 9
Early efforts to combat illegal Internet-transferred pornography
focused on Figure 1's source of the pornographic content.° Opera-
tors of online bulletin boards who offered subscriptions for access to
obscene photographs faced criminal liability under the standard fed-
eral anti-obscenity laws, indexed to the destination states' "community
standards" for obscenity."
The Communications Decency Act of 1995 (CDA) made it a
crime to, among other things, initiate the transmission of "indecent"
material to minors." The presumed high impact of the CDA on the
behavior of those placing information on the Internet was the source
of its constitutional vulnerability.° The relevant provisions of the CDA
were found unconstitutional precisely because they effectively re-
stricted the material available to children by restricting the material
available to anyone." The self-censorship of speakers on the Internet.
resulting from threatened criminal liability would deprive parents of
the ability to fine-tune what their children could see on the Internet.
The spillover effects on adults' own access to speech also posed a con-
stitutional problem.° The worry was that speakers wishing to avoid
9 Compare Playboy Enters. v. Webbworld, 991 F. Stipp. 543 (N.D. Tex, 1997) (in which
the creator of an Internet site which sold adult images from newsgroups was liable for
copyright infringement), with Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communications
Servs., 907 F. Stipp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (where an Internet access provider/bulletin
board service operator was held not directly liable for copyright infringement, in part be-
cause it was considered a "mere conduit" for unaltered information.)
10 See 18 U.S.0 §§ 1462, 1465 (2000). See generally U.S. v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (Gth Cir.
1996).
II See generally Thomas, 74 F.3d at 710, 711.
12 Sec47 U.S.0 § 223(a) (1)(B)(ii) (2000).
13 See id.
14 Sec Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997).
16 Sec id. at 874-75.
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liability for transmitting material illicit with respect to children might
choose to forego publishing such material entirely, rather than avail-
Mg themselves of the law's safe harbor through implementation of
credit card verification systems, which were thought to serve as a
crude method to distinguish adults from children. 16 Thus, the law's
deleterious effect on the availability of material not constitutionally
proscribable for adults was fatal to the provisions. 17
The CDA's constitutional infirmity might be confined to the dis-
tinct problem of "dual use" content—proscribable with respect to
some viewers but completely protected with respect to others—but.
the more general lesson is that legal duties placed upon the source of
Internet content can have powerful effects. 18 Indeed, other legal re-
quirements on sources of pornographic material, regardless of the
viewer, appear to be widely respected, at least among corporate pur-
veyors of pornography. For example, federal law requires those in the
pornography business to keep records about the identities and ages of
people featured in their materials, and to advertise their compliance
with the law's provisions. 19 A Web search on a citation to the law's
provision, "18 U.S.C. 2257," yields approximately 113,000 results 20—
the overwhelming majority of which appear to be statements of
compliance with the law offered by pornographic Web sites. 21
Other federal regulatory efforts focus quite naturally on the
source of an Internet communication. For instance, the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration has long held medical and pharmaceutical
Web sites responsible for their claims, 22 as have the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, 23 and the Federal Trade Commission. 24
Apart from public agencies' application of statutory and adminis-
trative law, aggrieved private parties and attorneys general have also
16 See id. at 876-77.
17 See id. at 874.
18 Congress has taken at least one additional (still constitutionally unsuccessful) stab at
regulating Internet speakers in this area, passing the Children's Online Protection Act. See
47 U.S.C. § 231 (a) (1) (2000). COPA limits its reach to commercial speech and narrows the
standard of covered material from indecency to that which is "harmful to minors," and
litigation over the provisions continues. See generally Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564
(2002); ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003).
19 Sec 18 U.S.0 § 2257 (2000); 28 C.F.R. § 75 (2002).
" Search performed on Google using "18 U.S.C. 2257" (Dec. 10, 2002).
21 Id.
22 See FDA, Advertising / Labeling Definitions, at littp://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/
adverdef. htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2003) (definition of advertising).
23 See generally, e.g., SEC V. SG, Ltd., 265 F.3d 42 ( lst Cir. 2001).
24 See generally, e.g., FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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sought redress against the sources of Internet content. Injured parties
can bring actions for defamation, 26 trade secret misappropriation, 26
and other common law torts, as well as copyright infringement ac-
tions, both civil and criminal. 27
 In the latter case, after a narrow inter-
pretation of the scope of the statute providing for criminal copyright.
infringement,28
 Congress amended the law to provide for criminal
penalties for those who willfully infringe copyrights by distributing
such works electronically, even without financial gain. 29
Although private civil actions against the source of the offending
material can effectively cause behavioral changes and directly target.
the "real wrongdoer in interest," a source-focused approach runs into
several consistent enforcement difficulties that have pushed aggrieved
parties to seek intervention in other phases of the transmission. First,
to the extent that the would-be defendant is an individual rather than
a firm, it may be difficult to pressure the defendant into restricting his
or her behavior. Individuals can be made to react to threatened sanc-
tions—indeed, perhaps with fewer reservations than corporations with
legal departments capable of mounting a thorough defense or at least
independent evaluation of legal claims asserted against them. But in
the absence of a specific threat, they may simply behave as they wish,
especially if they view the alleged wrong as malum prohibidum rather
than mahun in se. When they are one of apparently many engaging in
the objectionable behavior—such as swapping illicit pornography or
copyrighted material with other Internet users—the absence of an
alert corporate compliance department may preclude them from be-
lieving that they have crossed an actionable legal line or that they face
imminent sanction. Therefore they do not change their behavior pro-
spectively." Analogously, consider the relative ease with which state
sales tax can be collected from a merchant, compared to the corre-
21' See, e.g„ Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Stipp. 44, 51 (D.D.C. 1998).
26 See, c.g., Religious Tech. Cu. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1995).
27
 See generally U.S. v. Rothberg, No. 00CR85, 2002 WL 171963 (N.D. III. 2002) (finding
criminal copyright infringement); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal.
1999) (finding civil copyright infringement).
29 See generally U.S, r. LaMacchia. 871 F. Stipp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994).
29
 See No Electronic Theft Act. 17 U.S.0 §§ 101. 506, 507 (2000); 18 U.S.0 §§ 2319,
2319A. 2320 (2000), available at littp://www.usdoj.gov/ criminal /cybercrime/17-18red
hum (reversing the state of the law as interpreted in Laillacchia, 871 F. Stipp. 535),
30 Sec Steve Silberman. Caught in the Kid Porn Crusade, WIRED, Oct. 2002, available at
1 ttp:/ /www.wired .com/wired/a
 1.6 ive/10.10/ kid porn_pr.11 unl; see also Declan McCullagh,
DOJ to Swappers: Law Is Not on Your Side, CNE• NEws.com , Aug. 20, 2002, available at imp://
news.com.com/2100-1023-95,1591.html,
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sponcling use tax owed but rarely paid by an individual purchaser for
an out-of-state item sold by a seller unreachable by the state's power. 3 '
Second, the technical ability to link objectionable source materi-
als to a particular individual's identity is often difficult, adding ex-
pense and effort to an already cumbersome individual prosecution or
private lawsuit. In some cases a user's ISP has been enlisted to assist in
identifying the user. 32 For government action against illegal pornog-
raphy, informal practice is augmented by common law warrant and
statutory mechanisms through which ISPs can be enlisted to help
identify sources of obscenity or other criminal activity." ISPs can even
help the government eavesdrop on packets of data from the source
that might assist in an investigation or prosecution."
Early attempts to obtain information from ISPs in private cases
involved individuals seeking to identify the proper defendant of a per-
sonal defamation action or companies seeking the identities of em-
ployees or others alleged to be transmitting trade secrets or defama-
tory material." This requires varying degrees of online detective work
by the ISP itself, and, at least for private causes of action, ISPs have
sought to be exempted from having routinely to provide such infor-
mation." More recently, the copyright industries have also attempted
3 ' See generally Austan Goolsbee & Jonathan Zittrain, Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of
Taxing Internet Commerce, 52 NAT'L TAXI 413 (1999).
32 See. e.g.. Melvin v. Doe 789 A.2d 696. 697 (Pa. 2001), appeal granted by 805 A.2d 525
(Pa. Aug. 20, 2002); Carl S. Kaplan, Companies Fight Anonymous Critics with Lawsuits. CYBER
Li., Mar. 12, 1999, available at lutp://www.nytimes.cotn/library/tech /99/03/cyber/cyber
law/ 12law.h tml.
SCC 18 U.S.0 §§ 2702-2703 (2000); 47 U.S.0 § 551 (2000).
34 See. e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.0 §§ 2701-2711(2000); Ca-
ble Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.0 §§ 521-611 (2000); U.S. v. Kennedy. 81 F. Stipp.
2d 1103, 1107, 1111-14 (D. Kan. 2000). But see Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522
(2000); id. §§ 3121-3127 (regarding pen registers and trap and trace devices); In re Appli-
cation of United States of Am. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.0 § 2703(D), 157 F.
Stipp. 2d 286, 288-92 (S.D.N.Y 2001) (concluding that the government disclosure provi-
sion in § 551(h) of the CCPA does not apply to interne' service provided via cable).
35 Scc, e.g., Melvin v. Doe 789 A.2d 696, 697 (Pa. 2001), appeal granted by 805 A.2c1 525
(Pa. Aug. 20, 2002); Carl S. Kaplan, Companies Fight Anonymous Critics with Lawsuits. CYBER
14, Mar. 12, 1999, available at litip://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/03/cybericy-
berlaw/121aw.html.
36 See generally, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000
WL. 1210372 (Va. Cir. 2000). The fights over ISP assistance in uncovering and divulging the
identities of users alleged—but not proven—to have engaged in actionable behavior is
becoming known as the "John Doe" problem. See Chilling Effects, John Doe Anonymity,
available at http://www.chillingeffects.org/johndoe (last visited Apr. 22, 2003); Cyber-
SLAPP.org, Hontepage, available at http://www.cyberslapp.org/intro.cfm (last visited Apr.
22, 2003).
2003]	 Internet Points of Control	 663
to use this approach. Currently the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) and Verizon, in its role as an ISP, are litigating
whether the RIAA can enforce a subpoena upon Verizon demanding
identification of a Verizon user alleged to be illicitly sharing copy-
righted material through Verizon using a peer-to-peer services' As a
consequence of specific federal legislation on the subject, the pub-
lishers appear to have the strongest case among varioustypes of com-
plainants." 17 U.S.C. 512(10 appears to require a company like Veri-
zon to respond to such a subpoena, and the doctrinal support for
Verizon's refusal seems to rest upon a fairly tortured reading of the
statute at issue." Indeed, the trial court granted the RIAA's motion,
ruling that "the subpoena authority of section 512(h) applies to all
service providers within the coverage of the Act, including Verizon
and other service providers falling within subsection (a)."4°
Further, apart from the added effort of identifying a person be-
hind a communication's source, some would-be defendants may sim-
ply be physically remote from the complaining jurisdiction. They may,
therefore, be able to ignore an adverse judgment, or may interpose
legal arguments based on jurisdiction, choice of law, or comity con-
cerns. Reciprocal barriers between jurisdictions seem to exist in at.
least some circumstances. For instance, for First Amendment reasons
a U.S. federal court indicated an aversion to enforcing damages
flowing from a French court's finding of liability for transmission by a
U.S. company into France of material that is illicit there.'"
Finally; some private actors considering focusing efforts on data
interdiction at the source may want to be more circumspect in inter-
fering with users' data transfers. Government attorneys working to
indict possessors of child pornography likely have little concern for
offending them, but music companies and bands may wish to avoid
alienating their fans through assiduous filing of lawsuits against them.
3' Sec Recording Indus. Assn of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs„ 240 F. Stipp. 2c1 24
(D.D.C. 2002), available at littp://w)v•.techlalsjournal.com/courts2002/ritia_verizon/
20030121.asp; Motion to Enforce July 24, 2002 Subpoena Issued By This Court to Verizon
Internet Services, Inc. and Memorandum in Support Thereof, In Re. Verizon Internet
Services, Inc., (D.D.C. 2002) (No. I 02MS00323), available at http://www.riaa.com/pdf/
RIAAMotionToEnforce.pdf; RIAA, RIAA Asks Court to Enforce Limited Information Subpoena.
Aug. 20, 2002. available at itttp://www.riaa.com/News_Story.cfm?id=547.
" Seer U S.C.§ 512(h) (2000),
39 See id.
4° See RIAA, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
41 Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et FAntisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2c1 1181,
1194 (N.D. Cal. 2001 ). 	 .
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Those in entertainment industries may want to be especially judicious
about lawsuits when the pecuniary award is likely to be low relative to
the burden of bringing the suit. Private parties have not typically pur-
sued such cases unless to vindicate values apart from a purely eco-
nomic calculus of loss, such as the Church of Scientology's actions to
squelch online critics through claims—perhaps true—of copyright
infringement. 42
B. Asserting Control upon the Source ISP
Soliciting or forcing cooperation in blocking data transmissions
at the next stage in Figure 1's data transfer—by interceding with the
ISP of an offending source of Internet content—results in a different
matrix of hurdles from that of going after the source itself. Aggrieved
plaintiffs discover a generally more difficult legal position with a
slightly easier enforcement prospect should the legal position be vin-
dicated.
To explain, one must first distinguish between ISPs and online
service providers (OSPs). As ISPs, firms simply serve as a link between
a particular client entity (such as an individual customer or a smaller,
"downstream" ISP) and the Internet at large. But ISPs often do more
than simply pass along packets as illustrated in Figure 1; they, along
with other entities, also host content that is placed on their servers by
others and thereby act as online service providers. In network terms,
online service providers can properly be thought of as sources of
packets. Legally speaking, however, the liability of OSPs for content
hosted on their servers is a separate issue from the liability of the per-
son who posted the material to the OSP's server, and the liability of a
source's ISP, qua ISP, is another issue altogether. In the United States,
legal attempts to place responsibility upon OSPs for others' content
have met with mixed results, and the legal analyses employed typically
vary with the type of content that is at issue.
Illegal pornography is, unsurprisingly, nearly uniformly contrary
to the "acceptable use policies" of domestic OSPs, such as Yahoo!
Geocities and Angelfire that maintain general purpose bulletin
42 See,	 Lippard & Jeff Jacobsen, Scientology v. the Internet: Free Speech & Copyright
Infringement on the Information Super-Highway, 3 SK ErliC 3, 35-41 (1995), available at imp://
www.skeptic.com/03.3j1jj-scientology.html;  Declan McCullagh, Google Yanks Anti-Church
Sites, WIRED NESVS, Mar. 2L 2002, available at http://wwwwired ,cominews/politics/
0,1283,51233,00.html.
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boards, chat rooms, and home page hosting services. 45 Once alerted
to the claimed existence of illegal pornography OSPs usually act ex-
peditiously to remove it. 44 While the law may provide for responsibility
for an intermediary's continued hosting of obscene content, 45 so far
there has been no documented attempt by government authorities
within the United States to hold OSPs responsible for illegal pornog-
raphy placed on their servers by third parties in the absence of the
OSP's specifically encouraging, participating in, or being clearly aware
of the activity. For example, a recent investigation of illegal child por-
nography circulating within Yahoo! Groups appears to have resulted
in no charges against or other repercussions for Yahoo! itself. 46 Out-
side the United States, charges of transmitting illegal pornography
were once brought against the head of CompuServe's German sub-
sidiary by Bavarian provincial prosecutors because CompuServe made
available external Internet ,“newsgroup" feeds to its German custom-
ers that included such illegal material, but the resulting conviction
was overturned by an appellate court. 47
For the purpose of limiting illegal pornography, the most useful
function accomplished by the existence of a source OSP distinct from
the source of a communication may be that it routes data across state
lines, even if both endpoints are within a state. This could be a predi-
cate for invocation of obscenity importation statutes, and has been
found so in at least one case of a communication between an Ohio
43 See llthool GeoCities, Terms of Service, available at http://docs.yahoo.com/info/
terms/geoterms.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2003); Lycos (Angelfire), Terms and Conditions,
available at http://iufo.lycos.cont/legal/legal.asp (last visited Jan. 11, 2003).
44
 Sec Declan 111cCullagh, Thhool in Porn Foe's Sights, WIRED NEWS, Jun. 19, 2001, avail-
able at bttp://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283.44619,00.1nml.
43 An argument to this effect might be based on the distributor function that both
OSPs and bookstores serve. There is at least some prospect that bookstores could be held
responsible for carrying obscene books. Under Roth n U.S., obscenity is not protected
speech. 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1956). In that case, both (I) possession of obscene materials for
sale and advertising and (2) mailing obscene materials, as in a mail-order business, were at
issue. Id. at 480-81. The Court determined that states could prohibit these activities, Id. at
492-94. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Staten, reiterated this notion, and specifically mentioned
adult bookstores. 413 U.S. 49, 67-69 (1973). Paris suggested that, if a bookstore carried
obscene materials, access to the bookstore could be restricted or even wholly denied. Id. at
58 n.7.
46 Sec generally Silberman, supra note 30.
47 Sec Edmund L. Andrews, German Court Overturns Pornography Ruling Against Compu-
Serve, TIMES, Nov. 18, 1999, available at http://www.nytimes.coin/library/tech/  99/11
/biztech/art icles/18com puserve-germany.h mil.
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defendant and an Ohio minor that took place through a Virginia
ISP/OSP. 48
For common law claims, some close cases under state defamation
law in the early 1990s49—some favorable to OSPs, others less so—
sparked a movement by OSPs to urge Congress to create a pocket of im-
munity. Congress did so in section 230(c) of the Communications De-
cency Act of 1905.50
 Section 230(c) provides that "no provider or user
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider."51 Section 230(e) provides that such declaration should have
no effect on intellectual property law or federal criminal or telecom-
munications law, but that "no cause of action may be brought and no
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsis-
tent with this section."52
 This provision has been construed broadly
for state common law claims, effectively cutting off any redress for
those alleging harm resulting from an OSP's continued hosting of
defamatory or other content actionable under common law.55 The
provisions were not challenged and therefore not struck down in the
earlier litigation over the separate pornography-related aspects of the
law and therefore remain in effect. 54
For intellectual property, the doctrine is murkier. A patchwork of
cases generally eschews claims of direct copyright infringement for
OSP intermediaries who host allegedly infringing material provided
by others, 55 at least so long as the OSP did not appear to have a hand
in selecting or otherwise more carefully processing the work.56 Part of
48 See State v. Maxwell, 767 N.E.2d 242, 248-50 (Ohio 2002).
49 See generally, e.g., Crabby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 E Supp. 135 (S.D.N.1: 1991);
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Serv. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.I: Sup. Ct.
1995).
5°47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000).
st
52 Id. § 230(e).
52 See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc.. 206 F.3c1 980, 984-86 (10th
Cir. 2000); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3(1 327, 330-34 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49-52 (D.D.C. 1998); Jonathan Zittrain, The Rise and Fall of Sysop-
dom, 10 HARV. & TEcit. 495. 509-12 (1997).
64 See, e.g., Zittraiti, supra note 53. at 506-12.
65 See generally NIarobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distrib., 983 F. Supp. 1167
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (the real party in interest that created a Web site might be held liable for
copyright infringement, but not the OSP hosting that Web site); Sega Enter. Ltd. v.
MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Comm., 907 F. Stipp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
56 See Playboy, 991 F. Supp. at 549 (in which the OSP acted more as a simple commer-
cial portal, retrieving copyright images from elsewhere on the Internet and selling them to
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the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), without.
speaking to the ultimate issue of substantive liability for infringement
by those hosting others' content, provides a "safe harbor" process of
immunity from damages should OSPs act expeditiously to remove al-
legedly infringing content once notified in a particular structured
fashion. 57 It also allows for a further process of "counter-notification"
whereby the source of the content can assert back to the OSP that the
material is in fact not infringing.58
When intermediaries do not themselves host content, but are
merely conduits for it—as both the source and destination ISPs
Figure 1 would be—they are flatly immune from damages arising
from domestic copyright infringement claims, 59 and at least as im-
mune as OSPs within the other doctrinal areas.° To find otherwise
spawns an ad disasterum argument by which ISPs would find them-
selves in a comparable position to telephone companies asked to take
responsibility for the illegal content of calls traversing their net-
works—leaving them possibly out of business, and facing an impossi-
ble (and possibly itself lawbreaking) 61 task of monitoring subscribers'
communications.
For the purposes of limiting the unauthorized distribution of in-
tellectual property, the DMCA's statutory immunity for ISPs is care-
fully structured to block only actions for damages.62 Another section
of the Act provides for a process by which a court, under certain con-
ditions, can grant injunctive relief.° In the case of a source ISP, there
may be an order requiring a termination of the offending source's
account with the ISP or a termination of the rest of the world's access
to the user's assigned Internet destination, if the infringing material
resides there." For an OSP, an injunction may be framed as an order
requiring termination of the OSP user's account or removal or
blocked access to the material on the OSP's servers.°
its own subscribers); Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Stipp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (in
which the defendant appeared to be processing the contents of his bulletin board service






60 See, e.g., Lumley v. Prodigy Sens. Co.. 723 N.E.2d 539, 541 (1999) (defamation).
61 See 18 U.S.0 § 2511 (2000).
62 Sec 17 U.S.0 § 512(a).
65 See id. § 512( j).
66 See id.
Sec id.
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It may be this prospect of injunctive relief that has led to publish-
ers' practice of asking ISPs to monitor and police activity taking place
on their networks. For example, the Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) sent a letter to Harvard University complaining of
allegedly infringing material hosted by someone on the Harvard net-
work.66 Harvard, in turn, discovered that the material in question was
hosted by an undergraduate on his own computer attached to the
Harvard dormitory network.° Harvard sent a letter to the student
alerting him that such hosting was in violation of its network policies
and threatening sanctions should the student continue to host such
material.68
 Notices by publishers to ISPs seeking action by the ISPs
against individual users have become routine, with firms springing tip
to accept the outsourced task of identifying points of infringement
within a network and generating complaint letters to the relevant
ISPs.69
 Some publishers have even attempted to get source ISPs—uni-
versities, in particular—to change network architecture to prevent the
use of peer-to-peer networking completely. 70 While most have de-
clined to do so, at least one university, in the same week it sent a letter
to a publisher refusing to take action, announced a network band-
width conservation policy that clamped most outgoing Internet traffic
66 Letter from Courtney Bickel Lamberth, Allston Burr Senior Tutor, Winthrop House,
Harvard University, to Aaron Koller, Undergraduate Student, Harvard University (Oct. 17,




69 For example, NetPD provides "protection services to copyright owners whose mate-
rial is being pirated through the internet." NetPD, History, available at http://www.
netpd.com/a.htm
 (last visited Jan. 11, 2003). NetPD employs patented search technology
to locate infringing material online, and Islearch results are used for detailed strategic
planning, to assist in tactical execution, for evidence in support of major litigation, and/or
as the basis of a copyright control program." Id. Automated removal of infringing material
is also possible: "[alt the client's regnest. NetPD uses an automated process to carry out
rapid, bulk removal of infringing files being offered for free downloading. The process is
capable of being controlled by filters which can ensure a 'fan friendly' approach in which
different actions can be taken against sites based on the profile of the site. If and when the
files reappear, the infringing sites are detected, challenged and removed again." Id.
70 See, e.g., Letter from Howard E. King, Attorney, on behalf of Metallica and Dr. Dre.
to Neil L. Rudenstine, President, Harvard University (Sept. 6, 2000), available at http://
wwwitcomittlumich.edu/mp3/mp3ltr.html . Similar letters were sent to Columbia Univer-
sity, University of Virginia, Stanford University, Boston University, Georgia Institute of
Technology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Princeton University, University of
Michigan, University of California at Berkeley, University of California at Los Angeles, and
approiimately fifteen other large universities.
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from student dormitories, effectively dampening the university's con-
tribution to worldwide file sharing/piracy.n
For enforcement purposes, it may be easier to find and engage
an ISP regarding its legal responsibilities than a single subscriber of
that ISP. But if a revelation of subscriber identity is sought, success
merely pushes the enforcement problem back to dealing with a po-
tentially unreachable source. Moreover, when the ISP in question is
located overseas, cooperation of any sort is fraught with as many bar-
riers as those for faraway individual sources of illicit material. Indeed,
to the extent that particular activities are driven away from main-
stream ISPs, they may find a home in more obscure places and
through more obscure hosts—still only a click away from most con-
sumers of content around the world. This is precisely the behavior we
see with senders of unsolicited bulk email. They are difficult to track
down individually and while they may be shunned as clients by main-
stream ISPs (who in turn do not want to be penalized by other ISPs as
part of informal group enforcement of norms against spamming),
they can often use ill-configured or intentionally permissive overseas
servers as sending points for spam. 72
C. Asserting Control at the Destination
The "destination" end of Figure 1 has witnessed intensive at-
tempts to intercept certain categories of Internet content under
specific circumstances. Attempting to block illicit, material at the mo-
ment. just prior to a given Internet user's exposure to it has been at-
tempted when there is a disjunction between the destination com-
puter's owner and user, and the computer owner desires that the user
avoid certain Internet destinations, as parents might wish for chil-
dren. Personal computer filtering software allows a computer owner
to control or at least monitor some aspects of the computer's use, and
some filtering software is even built directly into Internet Web brows-
ers." Most filtering efforts are devoted to identifying and screening
71 See Kate L. Rakoczy, Computing Services Restricts Outbound Traffic on Network, HARV.
CRIMSON, Feb. 16, 2001, available at lutp://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=103233,
72 David E. Sorkin, Technical and Legal Approaches to Unsolicited Electronic Mail. 35 U.S.F.
1. Rev. 325, 363, 367 (2001).
73 See, e.g., Microsoft Internet Explorer, Configuring Content Advisor Settings, available at
http://www,microsoft.com/windows/ie/using/howto/contentadv/config.asp  (last visited
Jan. 10, 2003); N21.12, Homepage, available at http://www.N2H2.com (last visited Jan. 10,
2003); Net Nanny, Homepage, available at http://www.netnanny.com (last visited Jan. 10,
2003); Secure Computing, Homepage, available at littp://www.securecompu tin g.com/incl ex-
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out pornographic material, illegal or not, though the taxonomy of
sites filtered can be quite extensive. 74
Government attempts to force computer owners to configure
their computers to screen out illicit content have been primarily lim-
ited to laws conditioning federal funding on particular screening by
computers in schools and libraries, 75 or decisions by such public enti-
ties themselves to implement screening for their students and pa-
trons. 76
 In the United States, these efforts have met stiff, still unre-
solved, First Amendment challenges, grounded largely in filtering
software's inaccurate categorization and therefore overbroad blocking
of Web sites. 77
Many corporate environments have voluntarily adopted filtering
software for pornography, 78 in part clue to fears of liability for suborn-
ing a hostile work environment. 79 Copyright-infringing material is
now being rooted out via the same channels. The Software and In-
formation Industry Association encourages corporate workers to re-
port the use of unlicensed copies of software within companies to
js.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2003); SurfControl, Homepagr, available at http://www.surf-
control.cont
 (last visited Jan. 10. 2003); Websense, Homepage, available at http://www.web-
sense,com (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
74 See, e.g., Secure Computing, Products-at-a-Glance, available at htip://www.securecom-
puting.coni/index.crin?sKeys=86 (last visited Jan. 10, 2003); SurfControl, URL Category
List, available at littp://www.suricontrol.com/products/content/internet_databasesitirl_
category_list/defatilt.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2003); Websense, Advanced Filtering with
Premium Group Categories, available at http://www.websense.com/products/premium
groups/iiidex.cfm (last visited Dec. 5, 2002); Websense, Websense Master Database: Categories,
available at littp://www.websense.com/products/abotit/database/categories.cfm (last visit-
ed Dec. 5, 2002).
79 See generally Children's Internet Protection Act. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763A-335 (2002) (conditioning libraries' receipt of grants under the Library Services
and Technology Act, 20 U.S.0 §§ 9101-9176 (2000), and "E-rate discounts" for Internet
access and support tinder the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.0 § 254 (2000)).
76 See Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun County Library; 24 F. Supp. 2d
552, 556, 570 (E.D. Va. 1998).
77 Sec id. at 566-68, 570; see also Am. Library Ass'n v. U.S., 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 436-50,
470-96 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
78
 An April 2000 American Management Association Research Report found that 63%
of large and medium-sized businesses monitor their employees' Internet use, and 40%
block access to unauthorized or inappropriate Web sites. Sec generally Terry Carter, Untan-
gling the Web: Law Finns Seek to Avoid Injudicious Use of Internet Resources, A. 11.A. J., Sept. 2001,
available at littp://www,websense.com/company/news/mistise/01/090101.cfm;
 sec also
David Greenfield, Web@Work Employer Survey 2001: Termination and Litigation, available at
http:/ /www.websense.coM/ comp ny/news/resea rch/webatwork-employer2001.pdf (indi-
cating that 71% of companies block pornography).
79 See N21.12, Internet Usage and Legal Liability, available at http://home.zen.co.tik
/assets/pdf/liability_whitepapeLpdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2003).
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bring infringement suits and accompanying demands for settle-
ments.8° And further, at least one filtering manufacturer has an-
nounced a "Liability Protector Module" for its software, by which
companies can scan their employees' computers for illicit. software,
music, and other digital content.. 81
Certainly, controlling access to illegal content by using filtering
software only works when the computer's owner is convinced or com-
pelled to install it, and that is not an easy task when the user owns. the
computer. A number of digital rights management initiatives seek to
solve this problem by designing computers that inherently manage
content. according to publishers', rather than users', wishes. Such
computers would include limitations, if not outright filtering, in users'
operating systems and software so that sympathetic third-party owner-
ship of users' computers is not necessary. Successful implementation,
however, remains months, if not years, away. Furthermore, U.S. im-
plementation might not take place in the absence of controversial,
possibly constitutionally suspect, federal legislation designed to com-
pel hardware and software makers to agree with content producers on
the standards for such systems and to make the resulting standards
mandatory. 82 In an apparent attempt to avoid passage of standard-
setting legislation, in January 2003 two computer industry groups and
the RIAA issued a joint statement on policy principles that focused on
their willingness to work together on digital rights management.° No-
tably absent from the inter-industry accord, however, was the MPAA,
another key voice on the publisher's side of the debate. 84 It remains to
be seen whether the push to pass legislation on this issue will be re-
newed by the MPAA or other interested parties.
To be sure, possession of illicit pornography or the receipt of un-
authorized copyrighted material can be actionable in its own right,
but the threat of liability may have attenuated effects on individuals as
3° See SIIA, Anti-Piracy: Report Piracy, available at http://wwwsiia.net/piracy
/report/default.asp (last visited Dec. 6, 2002) (providing web forms to report piracy).
8t See Websense, Mavvirision and Websense Announce New Partnership to Prevent Unauthor-
ized Digital Material in the Wcaplace, available at http://wwwwebsense.com/company/
news/pr/02/100702b.cfm (last visited Jan. 11, 2003).
82 See Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th
Cong. (2002); Security Systems Standards and Certification Act, Draft Senate Bill 107th
Cong. (2001); Jonathan L. Zittrain, Taming the COIISUMer'S Computer, N.Y. MIES, Mar, 11,
2002, at A21.
as
	 and Record Company Policy Principles, available at http://www.bsa.org/tisa/
policp-es/7_principles.pdf (last visited Feb. 12. 2003).
Sr See id.
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consumers of content, just as it has its limits with individuals as
sources of such content. 85
 And apart from any deterrent effect, prose-
cutions would have to proceed laboriously against one user at a time
to make progress on the problem. The publishers have had little
stomach to mount copyright infringement actions against mere re-
cipients of protected material without further evidence of a desire
and capacity to traffic in it. 86
 Government prosecutors targeting pos-
session of illegal pornography appear to pick their individual prosecu-
tions carefully to conserve resources—focusing on people in positions
of special trust or responsibility. 87
D, Asserting Control upon the Destination ISP
The "destination ISP" has been perhaps the most neglected of
Figure l's possible points of control. Attempts to fix on ISPs legal re-
sponsibility for content that they carry from the network at large to
their own customers are rare, and legal authority to do so is nearly
nonexistent. 88
 Source ISPs benefit from a relationship with a particu-
lar subscriber and have a distinct ability to control that subscriber's
behavior through the crude lever of terminating the subscriber's ac-
count. Destination ISPs, however, are simply "off ramps" for others'
data solicited by the destination ISPs' customers and are remote from
faraway activities engaged in and/or hosted by others.
Destination ISPs are functionally equivalent to source ISPs with
respect to providing identifying information about their own sub-
scribers to those who might have a legal claim against them—such as
when a claim might be made for possession of illicit content, rather
than distribution of it, or when one might view the destination as
"importing" such data, much as a source could be viewed as "export-
ing" it. There is, however, no instance of a destination ISP being
found liable in its own right for passing along digital contraband re-
quested from a remote source by one of its customers.
Attempts are now underway to change the apparent immunity of
destination ISPs, perhaps because exercising control through the des-
tination ISP is comparatively appealing from an enforcement point of




 From a legal perspective, an attempt to hold a destination ISP responsible for the
content it carries would likely be viewed as functionally equivalent to attempting to en-
force liability against source ISPs since both ISPs are acting as "mere conduits." See supra
notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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view. Destination ISPs are by their nature local, easing jurisdictional
concerns since ISPs will have equipment and assets within the reach
of the interested jurisdiction. ISPs will conform their activities to fit
legal requirements and incentives, and while there are many ISPs, the
vast majority of Internet subscribers in the United States with Internet
access obtain their access from a small handful of providers. 89 Further,
many smaller providers are themselves resellers of larger providers'
services, such that pressure applied strategically to the concentric ISPs
serving smaller ISPs—one or two "dolls" up in a Matryoshka sequence
of destination ISPs—can cover large swaths of subscribers. In essence,
stopping a set of packages at the sender's drop box has its own
efficiencies but involves the difficulties of reaching a faraway sender
and his or her drop box. In a world in which there are only a handful
of international couriers entering one's jurisdiction, stopping such
identifiable packages after they have left the drop box but before they
have reached their respective destinations might prove more effective,
even if the sender's packages fan out. across multiple delivering firms
from their single initial point of entry into the flow of carriage.
Imposing controls on destination ISPs has been the approach of
governments that wish to control the flow of content over the
Internet but who cannot project that control beyond their
boundaries. For example, both Saudi Arabia and China have country-
wide filtering regimes in place. 9° While the filtering regimes are far
from perfectly effective at preventing access to undesired data, they
represent the most. effective point of blockage along the path of data
from faraway places into the personal computers of Internet users
within those countries, and they are maintained regularly by those
countries,91
89 Based on year-end 2000 revenue figures, the top ten ISPs in the U.S. accounted for
more than 66% of the total market share; the top four companies accounted for just over
half of the market share. Denise Pappalarrlo. The ISP Top Dogs, Ninrwoutc WORLD IN ET
SERVICES NEWSLETTER. May 30, 2001, available at http://www.mditsion.com/newsletters/
isp/2001/00846039.1und. According to India Infoline Sector Reports on Internet Service
Providers AOL is the largest retail ISP, with over 22 million subscribers and 40% of that
market segment. India Infolinc Sector Reports: Internet Service Pmvidets, at Intp://www.indiain
foline.com/sect/itsp/605.1nmi (last visited Apr. 30, 2003). AOL's share is more than the
next twenty ISPs' shares combined, Id. UUNet has a 26% market share in the business
segment, 43% in the wholesale segment, and 17% in the value-added services market;
UUNet has around double the market share of its nearest competitor in all three seg-
ments. Id.
9° Jennifer 8. Lee, Companies Compete to Amide Saudi Internet reit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2001, at C1-4, available at Intp://www,websense.com/company/news/companynews/01/
111901.cfm.
9 ' See NItctiAm. S. CilAsE JAWS C. MUIVENON, YOU'VE OJT DissEwr! CHINESE Dts-
SIM:NT USE or 'IllE INTERNET AND BEIJING'S COUNTER-S'ERATEGIES, at xii (2002), available
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II. FILTERING OBJECTIONABLE CONTENT USING DESTINATION ISPs:
THE PENNSYLVANIA MANEUVER
The first sustained effort in the United States at content control
through destination ISPs is now under way. The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania has, in essence, sought to replicate the Chinese govern-
ment's filtering scheme within Pennsylvania's borders, substituting
the narrow category of alleged illegal child pornography for the
much broader range of material that China censors via destination
ISPs.
A law passed in February 2002 adds a section to the Pennsylvania
criminal code that, among other things, provides the following:
GENERAL RULE.—An Internet service provider shall re-
move or disable access to child pornography items residing
on or accessible through its service in a manner accessible to
persons located within this Commonwealth within five busi-
ness days of when the internet service provider is notified by
the Attorney General pursuant to subsection (g) that child
pornography items reside on or are accessible through its
service.92
The law is careful to state that the destination ISP is not under
any affirmative obligation to monitor the flow of data through its
routers for child pornography." But once notified by the state attor-
ney general according to a structured process that "child pornogra-
phy items" can be found at a faraway source, the ISP must disable ac-
cess to that source within five business days under threat of criminal
penalty.94 Noncompliance constitutes a misdemeanor for the first two
offenses and a felony for subsequent ones. 95
The first publicly known demand for a block under the statute
happened in July 2002, when an official in the state attorney general's
office sent a series of "informal notices" to ISP WorldCom demanding
that particular Internet sources of data be made inaccessible to Penn-
at http://wivw.rand.org/publications/MIVIAR1543/; Lee, supra note 90, at C1-4; Jona-
than Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Documentation of Internet Filtering librldwide, available at
lutp://cyber.lawharvard.edu/filtering (last updated Apr. 3, 2003).
92 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 7330(a) (2002) (Section 7330 was repealed by 2002, Dec. 16,
P.L. 1953, No. 226, Section 2. but it was replaced by an essentially identical set of statutes.
18 PA. CONS. S'L'AT. §§ 7621-30 (2003)).
93 Sec id. § 7330(b).
Id. § 7330(a), (c).
99 Id. § 7330(c).
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sylvania WorldCom subscribers." WorldCom refused to block the sites
on the basis of those informal notices. 97
 As a result, the state attorney
general obtained a formal order from a state criminal trial judge re-
quiring WorldCom to disable access to five Internet, points of pres-
ence found by the judge—on the basis of affidavits supplied by the
attorney general—to have "probable cause" to contain child pornog-
raphy." Several days later, WorldCom notified the attorney general's
office that a few of the sites listed in the order had already been dis-
abled at the source—perhaps as a result of WorldCoin's alerting the
remote hosting OSP that the material violated the OSP's terms of
service.99
 Two sites not blocked at the source were then blocked by
Worl dCom. 0°
If a constittitional challenge were brought against Pennsylvania's
statute, it might be struck clown for a variety of reasons. Some of its
potential infirmities may inform a more general discussion of the
constitutional prospects for other forms of control of destination ISPs
for other purposes, such as to limit the unauthorized movement of
copyrighted material, and also shed light on the propriety of such
control as a public policy matter.
A. Objections Arising froth Locally Mandated Control of a Global Network.
WorldCom insists that it does not have the technical ability to dis-
criminate in its packet routing between Pennsylvanians and non-
Pennsylvanians as customers; thus the mandated blocks have been
implemented for all WorldCom subscribers, regardless of location. 101
The prospect of local regulation overreaching because of an all-or-
98 Sec Mantle Affidavit of Probable Cause, In the Matter of the Application of D. Nil-
chael Fisher, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for an Order Re-
quiring an Internet Service Provider to Remove or Disable Access to Child Pornography
( July 2002) (No. Misc. 689) (on file with author).
97 Id.
98 Sec Sept. 17, 2002 Order of Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Penn-
sylvania, In the Matter of the Application of D. Michael Fisher, Attorney General of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for an Order Requiring an Internet Service Provider to
Remove or Disable Access to Child Pornography ( July 2002) (No. Misc. 689) (on file with
author).
"1
 Letter from Craig Silliman, Director of Technology and Network Legal, WoridCom,
to John J. Burfete, Jr.. Chief Deputy Attorney General, Office of Attorney General of Penn-
sylvan ia (Sept. 23, 2002) (on file with author).
too a
1 ° 1 Id.
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nothing impact on Internet users has led at least one court to strike
down such regulation on dormant commerce clause grounds. 1 °2
The law in question was a New York State sibling to the Federal
CDA, and without reaching the First Amendment questions later re-
solved against the CDA by the United States Supreme Court, a federal
district court issued an injunction blocking enforcement of the state
law because, among other reasons, "the unique nature of cyberspace
necessitates uniform national treatment." 105 To be sure, the New York
law imposed responsibilities on out-of-state sources of Internet trans-
missions that could arrive at. New York destinations and Pennsylvania's
law seeks to limit its reach only to the activities of ISPs within the state.
To the extent. that WorldCom's technical claim is credited, however, a
court might be skeptical of a law that would necessarily affect World-
Com customers outside Pennsylvania's jurisdiction. 104
While WorldCom's technical claim of all-or-nothing filtering may
be literally true, it also may be subject to change with the application
of technical expertise. Routing protocols and hardware built by peo-
ple can be revised by people; a change to the code could permit "zon-
ing" previously not possible. 05 Indeed, a panel of experts convened by
a French judge to evaluate the prospect of OSP Yahoo! limiting the
online distribution of displays of Nazi memorabilia within France—
while not limiting such display to non-French parties—concluded that
such geographic zoning was possible, at least when attempted by an
OSP seeking to categorize the locations of its visitors. 106 Their findings
paved the way for the French court to ask that Yahoo! block the illegal
material, secure that France would not be necessarily imposing its
own laws de facto on the rest of the world should Yahoo! accede. 1 °7
102 See Am. Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Stipp, 160,183-84	 1997).
103 Id. at 184.
104 See id. at 183-84.
ws See generally, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. Rev, 1403
(1996).
we See Interim Court Order, County Court of Paris, France (Nov. 22, 2000), available at
http://www.cdt.orgispeech/international/001I2Oyahoofrance.pdf (containing the Opin-
ion of the Consultants Ben Laurie, Francois Wallon and Vinton Cerf, La Ligue Contre Le
Racisine Et PAntisemitisme and L'Union Des Etudiants juifs De France v. Yahoo!, Inc. and
Yahoo France).
107 See id.
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B. Objections Arising from Process
The substantive regulation of child pornography, as a form of
obscenity, is generally outside the ambit of First Amendment. review. 108
The categorization of material as obscene, however, is itself fraught
with First Amendment implications. Pennsylvania's law contemplates
a judge's finding that there is "probable cause" that the material to be
blocked is child pornography.'" But the finding is made ex parte and
the source of the material, the real party in interest, is not notified
that the material is slated for state-mandated interception.' 10 By anal-
ogy, if the government ordered teamsters ferrying newspapers from
the printing presses to newsstands to divert their cargo to the town
dump because it was deemed in an ex parte proceeding to have
"probable cause" of containing obscene material, the order would be
a prior restraint subject to the highest level of scrutiny)" The news-
paper publisher could likely object further on due process grounds if
not alerted to the order and given a chance to object. 112
 Further,
blocking a given destination under Pennsylvania's law has no particu-
lar dme limit. 113 This, then, is as if the government banned not only a
108 See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (classifying child pornography
as a category of material outside the protection of the First Amendment),
109 See 18 PA. CoNsT. STAT. § 7330(f) (2002).
, 110 That the determination may be made ex parte is provided in 18 PA. CONST. Slat,
ANN. § 7330(f). While there is detailed provision for the targeted ISP to get notice of an
action under this .statute, there is no provision in § 7330 for notification of the source of
the offending material. See 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 7330 (g ).
in Under Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, prior restraints were found to be highly disfa-
vored. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The only exception the Court allowed to the unconstitutional-
ity of prior restraints was the "troopship exception," which is roughly equivalent to very
strict scrutiny. See id. at 715-16. The disfavored character of prior restraints was also evi-
dent in the Court's decision in New Volt Times a U.S., where two justices found an absolute
bar to prior restraints, one justice indicated that they would be subject to strict scrutiny,
and two justices recognized that U.S. constitutional law provides "extraordinary protection
against prior restraints." 403 U.S. 713, 714-15, 726-27, 730 (1971).
I " The ex parte procedure employed in this hypothetical would run afoul of the
Court's holding in Freedman a Maryland, that certain procedural protections were required
to avoid the unconstitutionality of a prior restraint. 380 U.S. 51, 60 (1965). Among other
procedural considerations, the Freedman Court indicated that a judicial determination in
an adversary proceeding must be available before the restraint has finality. See id. at 59.
Since putting the papers in the dump would likely be considered "final," the ex parte pro-
ceeding would probably not pass constitutional muster. See id. at 60. Also under procedural
due process law; namely the Court's decision in Mathews v. Eldridge, the necessary proce-
dural protections would be determined by balancing the Mathews factors: the significance
of the private interest that would be affected by the government action; the extent to
which additional procedural safeguards would reduce the risk of error; and the public's
interest in resolving the matter quickly and efficiently. 424 U,S. 319, 335 (1976).
LI3 Sec 18 PA. COMES. S rA r. § 7330 (lacking a time limit provision).
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given issue of a newspaper, but all future newspapers emanating from
a given printing press, without checking to see if future editions con-
tained the material claimed to provide the justification for the ban)"
To be sure, as Section I explains, the source of a data transfer on
the Internet is quite often anonymous, especially in the case of possi-
bly illicit material—making notifications difficult and possibly consti-
tuting a form of waiver of notification, 115 As part of the growing num-
ber of cases surrounding "John Doe" subpoenas, however, source ISPs
and OSPs asked to reveal what they know about the identities of their
difficult-to-track subscribers have developed voluntary mechanisms to
notify such subscribers of these requests) 16 Some jurisdictions have
permitted those subscribers to then argue—while their identities re-
main unknown—for a quashing of the subpoena as the real party in
interest) 17
Prospective viewers of the Internet sites slated for blocking un-
doubtedly have constitutional interests of their own to advance. 118
Internet users attempting to access sites blocked under the law will
not be informed why the sites are unavailable. 119 Given the nature of
routing as described in Figure 1, the block could be taking place any-
where along the chain of packet-passing, and current routing proto-
cols offer scant opportunity for an explanation—packets are either
routed or not, and an Internet user's software simply reports a failure
to connect should the circuit not be completed for any reason.
An apparent system of informal notifications by law enforcement
to destination ISPs, resulting in blocked sites without explanation to
the Internet users attempting to access them, or even formal
notifications to ISPs still not readily made available to the public, is
deeply troubling as a policy matter. Given the apparent reluctance of
Pennsylvania ISPs to demand formal invocation of the law, much less
to litigate a use of it, such a system would seem to give the govern-
ment significant power to infringe Internet users' First Amendment
rights, without the users' knowledge that the government was acting
at all. Of course, the law could be amended to provide for public
114 This is precisely what was found to he unconstitutional in Neat: 283 U.S. at 721.
118 See supra Section 1.
116 Sec generally Doe v. 2Thels.lart.com Inc.. 140 F. Supp.2d 1088 (W.D.Wash. 2001).
117
t18 See, e.g.. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, 425
U.S. 748, 756-72 (1976) . (finding that consumer have First Amendment-protected interests
in receiving certain commercial information).
118 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7330 (2002) (failing to mention any notice to Internet us-
ers).
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notification of sites blocked. To do so, the government must create a
public index to illegal material often only partially blocked, since
there might be ISPs beyond the state boundaries not subject to the
order.
Alternatively, ISPs themselves could maintain the public lists. ISPs
might be the best custodians for the purposes of conveying to the
public when a failure to reach an Internet point of presence is due to
government intervention. If each state government, as well as the
federal government, maintained its own lists, interested Internet users
would have to search every jurisdiction with relevant regulations to
see if a site has been ordered blocked in the absence of a system to
aggregate data across jurisdictions. Either way, many users would have
to speculate whether an ISP with whom they are not in direct privity
might be affecting their attempts to reach a site—a surmise that.
would have to be grounded in knowledge of routing tables and the
user's ISP's relation to other ISPs within the Matryoshka doll chain or
peers within the cloud. For example, users of millet, a WorldCom sub-
sidiary, would have to know that their packets were going through
WorldCom's servers. Users at a particular university might find their
packets routed through a WorldCom backbone and thus dropped if
in relation to a banned site without realizing that they should be con-
sulting WorldCom's list of blocked sites for the explanation, since they
were in fact relying on WorldCom to carry those packets along the
chain.
C. Objections Arising from Over locking
Refusing to carry packets is a crude instrument of Internet disci-
pline. ISYs and operators of backbone routers within the cloud have
developed the means to selectively ignore packets labeled as to or
from a specific IP address as a form of "Internet death penalty," prin-
cipally reserved to prevent denial-of-service attacks or large-scale seam
in progress. 12° Such attacks can consist of a stream of packets from a
given set of sources targeted to overwhelm a particular destination,
and can cause congestion along the chain of ISPs carrying those
packets, particularly those close to the destination. Tools developed by
ISPs to implement the Internet death penalty against hackers and
spammers enable those ISPs to then hew to a Pennsylvania court or-
12e See On.Line Hacker Jargon File: Version 4.3.3, Internet Death Penalty (Sept. 20, 2002),
available at littp://jT-gon.watson-net.cotn/lexicon.asp?L=0.
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der asking for the same treatment of sources of allegedly obscene ma-
terial.
Internet routing and numbering characteristics described earlier,
however, make blocking on a broad scale difficult for an ISP, and sug-
gest persistent overblocking in many circumstances. 121 First, broad
scale blocking is difficult because each router along the chain of a
transmission maintains a table of possible destinations, just as neigh-
bors passing mail from one house to the next need to recall which
houses are westward and which are eastward. To be able to document
simply that "all Los Angeles addresses are westward" compresses the
handling of many individually addressed letters into one easy rule of
thumb. Indeed, one might know that all letters bearing ZIP codes be-
ginning with nine should be passed to the west. Routers behave simi-
larly, and pausing to consider a special rule or exception for a single
destination increases the router's work. China, however, appears to
have overcome this limit as it embeds thousands of exceptions in oth-
erwise standard routing tables serving its Internet users, 122 suggesting
that WorldCom and others could come to do so as well.
Second, and technically more vexing, IP addresses may be reas-
signed from time to time, or even moment to moment. Pennsylvania's
order to WorldCom demanded blocking for distinct "uniform re-
source locators," one level of abstraction higher than IP addresses.'"
Should the site found at http://www.blockedsite.com/blockedsite
move to a new or additional IP address while retaining its URL—a
feature explicitly intended for domain names and the URLs in which
they are often found—an ISP's routing tables would continue block-
ing a now irrelevant IP address, and possibly the new digital denizen
there, as IP addresses, like telephone numbers, are recycled. At the
same time, the routing tables would permit. packets to pass to and
from the illicit site's URL at its new IP destination. Wor!Korn ad-
verted to this problem in response to Pennsylvania's attorney general,
121 See supra Section 1.
122 SccJonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman. Empirical Analysis of Internet Filleting in
China (Nov. 2002), available at Intp://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filteringichina/; see also
CHASE & NIULVENON, Stipta note 91, at xii; Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edehnan, Real-
Time Testing of Internet Filtering in China, available at http:/ / cyber.law.harvard.edu
/filtering/china/test/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2003).
123 Sept. 17, 2002 Order of Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery Comity, Pennsyl-
vania, In the Matter of the Application of D. Michael Fisher. Attorney General of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for an Order Requiring an Internet Service Provider to
Remove or Disable Access to Child Pornography, ( July 2002) (No. Misc. 689) (on file with
author),
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indicating that it would continue to check the sites to be blocked to
see if they retained their URL's but directed them to new IP ad-
dresses. Blocking individual URLs, rather than IP addresses, is not
impossible, but the tools to reliably do so on a large scale appear to
exist only among countries devoting particular energy to countrywide
filtering, such as Saudi Arabia, and in a recent and sporadic comple-
ment to its IP filtering, China."4
Retaining blocking at the IP level also means that a site hosting
multiple, unrelated users' work, such as littp://www.blockedsite.com/
illegalmaterials and littp://www.blockedsite.com/innoctiotismaterials,
could find all its users blocked by various destinations' ISPs since all
users' work can be found at the same IP address. The Pennsylva-
nia/WorldCom case included a demand to block material made avail-
able by a user of one such overseas host, Spain's OSP terra.es. 125 The
attorney general's cover letter to WorldCom accompanying the
court's order acknowledged this all-or-nothing dilemma, suggesting
that WorldCom could escape it by persuading t.erra.es to remove the
offending page."° WorldCom did just that, 127 but had terra.es not
complied, Pennsylvania citizens would have been denied access to
substantial amounts of speech they possess a constitutional right to
see, viz. the content created by terra.es users unrelated to the alleg-
edly obscene content created by a single terra.es  user. Denying access
would create the very dynamic that so troubled the U.S. Supreme
Court as it struck down most provisions of the Comnumications De-
cency Act. 128
There is another form of overblocking to consider. Even if a site
containing offending content can be solely targeted, all Interne. t, activ-
ity to and from that source is blocked. A computer might serve as
both a source of Internet Web content and_ as a surfing tool for its in-
dividual user; blocking by the destination ISP renders that computer a
pariah with respect to the destination ISP's customers and peers for
all purposes.
124 See Zittrain & Edelman. supra note 91.
125 Notice Under 18 Pa. Const. Stat. § 7330, In the Matter of the Application of D. Mi-
chael Fisher, Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pa. Criminal Division ( July
2002) (No. Misc. 689) (on file with author).
' 26 Letter from D. Michael Fisher, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, to Craig Silliman, Attorney, WorldCom Network and Facilities Legal Team (Sept. 17,
2002) (on file with author).
127 Letter from Craig Silliman, supra note 99.
128 Sec supra Section I.A.
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To the extent the lack of subtlety in blocking is unavoidable, per-
haps it could be permissible. Of more importance is a sense of just
how much tinkering would have to occur to provide for a nuanced
system of content control. Courts, perhaps rightly, might expect such
tinkering to take place when suitable opportunities are presented. For
example, the online filesharing service Napster was ordered to under-
take changes to its technical architecture to block unauthorized copy-
righted material from being indexed for its users, while allowing in-
nocuous material to pass. 129 The Napster example represents a baby-
splitting compromise of the sort that the Supreme Court was not
squarely asked to consider when it ruled on the status of VCRs as in-
struments of contributory copyright infringement.'" Rather, the
Court balanced the devices' legitimate uses against illegitimate ones
and imagined that the devices would be either wholly banned or
wholly allowed, without being asked to contemplate ordering manu-
facturers to attempt to rework the devices to proscribe illegitimate
uses."' If ISPs are capable of learning to filter more exactingly, the ad
disasterum arguments that so powerfully bar impulses to ask ISPs to
control or monitor their networks vanish.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF ASSERTING CONTROL AT THE DESTINATION ISP
Pennsylvania's approach is one in a series of laws designed to
force destination 1SPs to assist in Internet content control. On Octo-
ber 10, 2002, the New Jersey State Assembly took up a bill nearly iden-
tical to Pennsylvania's." 2
 On October 21, 2002, a Canadian member
of Parliament reintroduced a proposed Internet Child Pornography
Prevention Act, incorporating Pennsylvania's approach with the addi-
tional prospect of requiring destination ISPs to monitor for obscene
content. 133
129
 Mal Records v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 1009483, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2000).
15' Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Stipp. 429, 469 (D.C. Cal.
1979). Without dwelling on possible approaches to reengineer the VCR to better restrict
infringing uses while permitting noninfringing ones, the Court may well have considered
playback-only VCR's differently from those with both recording and playback capabilities.
131 Id. at 4689.
132 Assembly No. 2863, 210th Leg. (NJ. 2002), available at littp://www.njleg.state.nj.
us/2002/Bills/A3000/12863_11.PDF (no longer available) (not yet enacted into law, the
bill is available online).
133
 Internet Child Pornography Act, R.S.C., ch. C-234 (2002) (Can.), available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbusichambus/house/bills/private/C-234/C-234_1/3720
10bE.htinl.
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Pornography is not the only content at issue. A German court has
held that. approximately sixty destination ISPs in the state of North-
Rhine Westphalia can be lawfully asked to block German customer
access there to two U.S.-hosted Web sites determined by the German
government to contain banned Nazi propaganda."4
Further, in a short-lived case that would have proved an interest,
ing test of the DMCA's provisions on injunctions,' thirteen record
companies filed a lawsuit in August 2002 to force five major domestic
ISPs, in their role as destination ISPs and backbone providers within
the Internet cloud,'" to block their customers' Web access to
www.listen4ever,com, an allegedly unauthorized China-based source
of the plaintiff companies' copyrighted music." 7 The record compa-
nies' complaint echoes many of the limitations previously described
for each of the alternatives to intervention at the destination 1SP
phase of data transit: the identities of the actual operators of the lis-
ten4ever site are unknown; 138 the source ISP is itself in China, a loca-
tion allegedly selected precisely to place it beyond the reach of U.S,
copyright law;"9 and the source ISP has ignored cease and desist. let-
ters."° Furthermore, Internet users within the United States ("desti-
nations" in Figure 1) could easily find the site, navigate its English
language prompts, and search for and download the copyrighted mu-
sic."' Days after filing the suit, the plaintiffs withdrew their claims, 142
perhaps because the listen4ever site had apparently vanished.
Unlike the scope of Pennsylvania's law, the Federal provisions
under which the record companies sought the injunction appear to
limit compelled blocking to sites hosted outside the United States) ."
134
 Sec Germany: The Idea of Internet Providers Blocking Illegal Content is Questionable, 8
SAFER INTERNET, Nov. 2001, at 3, available at Intp://www.saferinternet.org/new.s/safer8 .
h tin; see also Heise Online, Haft:trig fii r irehtswiddge Inbalte ftvglich, Oct. 15, 2001, available at
http://www.heise ,cle/newsticker/clata/hod-15.10.01-000/ (for a description in German of
the first German court's decision lit this case); Vigilant.tv, Heise: Duesseldoll Arranges Imme-
diate Blockage of Nazi Websites, Sept. 13, 2002, available at http:/ /vigilara.tv /article/2162
(describing second German court's reiteration of the blocking order).
196 17 U.S.C. § 512( j) (2000).
158 See supra Figure 1.
I ," Sec generally Complaint, Arista Records, Inc. et al. v. AT&T Broadband Corp. et al.,
No. 02 CV 6554 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2002) (on file with author).
138
 Id.q 39.
139 Id. 1 40.
141) 1d. 1 43.
141 Id.
H 5
 Notice Of Voluntary Dismissal, Arista Records, Inc. et al. v. AT&T Broadband Corp.
et al.. (KMW) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21. 2002) (No. 02 CV 6554) (on file with author).
143 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(B) (2000).
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Furthermore, in weighing a request made pursuant to the copyright
statute, the court is to consider, among other things, the burden such
an injunction would place upon the defendant ISPs, whether less
burdensome but equally effective means of dealing with the problem
exist, and the extent to which the requested blocking might interfere
with access to noninfringing material at other online locations.'"
Thus the copyright-protecting mechanisms for enlisting ISP assistance
in blocking sources of illicit data set a higher threshold than is evident
in the Pennsylvania counterpart provisions against child pornography
for imposition of a blocking order. The additional showing required
in the copyright setting is fact-based, and those facts are evolving as
more and more pressures are placed upon backbone providers and
destination ISPs to discriminate in their carriage of data. As ISPs
augment their tools to hew to requirements like Pennsylvania's, the
technical burden on them to block sites under the DMCA's injunction
provision will naturally drop, and the effectiveness of the block—at
least for the overseas sites which are the most nettlesome to the com-
plainants and specifically provided for in the Act—is far greater than
contemplated intervention at other points in the chain.
In tandem with blocking technology refinements, adjustments to
the legal principles for mandated blocking by destination ISPs and
backbone providers can make such interventions less constitutionally
suspect. For example, the law might provide for procedures to at-
tempt to give notice to and an opportunity to object to the real party
in interest, i.e. the source of the alleged illicit material. Legislators
might also contemplate procedures for reviewing blocked sites at
regular intervals to see if blocking is still merited under the original
standard of the injunction. Legislators could also provide for a tech-
nically sophisticated list of blocked sites, so that the affected public
can know why—and on whose authority—it is prevented from reach-
ing a given source of information on the Internet.
If the legal provisions are refined as much as possible to account
for the sort of objections previously described and technical adjust-
ments are made to minimize the technical burden to ISPs asked to
block particular sources of data from their customers, what problems
remain?
144 Id. § 5120)(2).
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A. Overblocking
Filleting on the basis of IP addresses remains a crude metric
along several dimensions. First, when a given 1P address corresponds
to a computer hosting content from several distinct and unrelated
users—as in the terra.es example from the Pennsylvania court order
to WorldCom—blocking that IP address presents an all-or-nothing
proposition. Of course, hosts like terra.es would themselves likely ad-
just for major blocking of their content by destinations that matter to
them—by either adopting acceptable use policies in line with local
law to avoid receiving the "Internet death penalty," or carving differ-
ent. users' sites into different IP addresses precisely to prevent spill-
over effects. And, with China and Saudi Arabia leading the way, desti-
nation ISPs (if not cloud-residing backbone providers) might learn to
filter on the basis of a URL instead of an IP address.
Second, blocking of a given source of data—whether by IP ad-
dress or by URL—typically blocks all data between that source and the
blocking ISP's client destinations. Technical adjustments might seek
to make filtering more granular, but this requires anticipation of the
ways in which the source computer is being used, and for what. pur-
poses. Again, China leads the field. 145 Beginning in the fall of 2002,
China's destination ISPs began to search data packets for particular
sensitive keywords.m When specific keywords are found, access by the
user in China to the source of data in question is cut. off for a desig-
nated period of time. 147 For example, a search for "Jiang Zemin" on
Google from some Chinese computers will result in part of a results
page being loaded, followed by a loss of access to Google for a certain
period of time. 148
B. Violation of End- to-End Principles
Those who designed the Internet's protocols espouse an engi-
neering rule of thumb—keep the middle of the network simple and
implement fancy' functions at the endpoin ts. 149 They also observe that
"' See Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Replacement of Googly with Alternative





to J.H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, Second International
Conference on Distributed Computing Systems 509-512 (Apr. 1981), available at http://
wth.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/endtoend/endtoend.mss.
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complexity is the bane of scalability. 15° Accordingly; Internet engi-
neers recommend that even such routine features as error checking
are best implemented apart from basic Internet Protocol routing. Re-
cently the end-to-end argument has taken on a political dimension; it
has been adopted by those arguing against corporate mergers that
might diversify the incentives and strategies of network players who
previously simply sought to move packets from one point to another
as quickly as possible." For example, a company that is both a back-
bone provider and a source of content on the Internet might begin to
privilege the passage of its own data over those of its competitors.
Such actions are both undesirable and best avoided by preventing any
diffusion of the typical network provider's corporate mission.
The technical aspect of the end-to-end argument suggests a warn-
ing against blocking data transmissions at any point in Figure 1 apart
from the source and destination endpoints. To implement common
blocking—aside, perhaps, from the extreme cases in which network
providers ignore certain packets if they are deemed part of a hacking
attempt—would risk the reliability of the network itself. Such con-
cerns might be best understood as echoes of the claim that hundreds
or thousands of exceptions to default routing tables, which would be
required for widespread ISP-level source IP address blocking, could
slow everyone's routing to a crawl and would naturally result in incon-
sistent results depending on what path one's data happened to take
across the entirety of Figure 1. Inconsistent results on the basis of
network provider variance outside or within the network cloud breaks
the illusion of "one click" nearness of every point to every other net-
work point. Further, users wishing to evade blocking will come up
with kludges that themselves put further stress on the network; some
will use virtual private networks or other proxy to relay data inaccessi-
ble from their point of presence through a point that is mutually ac-
cessible. While any given workaround might be blocked and problems
resulting from the discontinuity between the network functions of IP
addressing and the desired use of IP addresses or URLs to implement
15° Id.
151 See. e.g.. Mark Lentley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Arehi-
wine of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 2000 BERKELEY LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PA-
PERS, available at http://www.bepress.com/blewp/default/vo12000/iss2/art8; Written Ex
Parte of Professor Mark A. Letnley and Professor Laurence Lessig, In re Application for
Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses MediaOne Group, Inc. to AT&T Corp.,
(F.C.C. 1999) (CS No. 99-251), available at hup://cyber.lawliarvard.edu/svorks/lessig/
cable/kr/fed-turd.
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filtering of objectionable content may eventually be solved, one must
still be cautious about the spiral of patches, tweaks, and overlays that
cumulatively could severely impair the Internet as it exists now When
"tussles" between network parties are fought out through the network
protocols themselves, the efficient funCtioning of the network is
threatened. 152
Of course, these technical objections are persuasive in inverse
correlation to the extent to which would-be regulators feel aggrieved
by the Internet's status quo. So, too, perhaps are the political end-to-
end arguments, which in their general form can be constructed to
inveigh against any form of blockages along the network path that
deviate from the standard protocols which call for nondiscriminatory
routing. But regulators might want to consider the "portability" effects
of causing network carriers to develop smarter tools to filter data,
whether at the IP address level or in a more refined way. Portability
concerns drove at least one objection to a set of filtering standards
that could be used to categorize Web sites; even if the filtering on the
basis of those standards was intended to take place at an endpoint.
(typically the destination, through user-installed filters), the fear was
that governments could use the framework to mandate country-wide
filtering of objectionable content.'" Changes in the network's func-
tionhig to accommodate blockages for pornography or intellectual
property deemed truly proscribable could in turn make it substan-
tially easier for authoritarian regimes to enhance their nascent coun-
try-wide destination ISP filtering systems. A meta-ideology of network
freedom—even understanding that such freedom carries distinct
harms within one's first-level ideology—might be necessary. At the
very least, one might wish to take into account end-to-end violation
and portability effects when weighing the costs and benefits of man-
dated filtering for an ostensibly narrow purpose and conclude that.
the solution is disproportionately large in relation to the ack-nowl-
edged problems.
CONCLUSION: PROPOSING A NETWORK USER'S BARGAIN
The Internet's persistent tensions with many prevailing legal
frameworks arises in large part from its distributed peer-to-peer reach:
I " David D. Clark et al., Tussle in Cyberspace: Defining TOMOrttliO'S Internet, SIGCOMM
(2002), available at h ttp://nww.acm.org/sigcomm/sigcomm2002/papers/ttissle.pdf./WWW,M111,0rgiSigCOMM/SigC01111112002/paperS/IlISSIC.pdf.
1159 Lawrence Lessig, Tyranny in the Infrastructure, 5.07 WIRED (July 1997), available at
kit p://www.wired.com/wirer1/5.07/qber_rigli
 ts_prhunl.
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an ability to bring together one individual with another when neither
is accustomed to direct regulation of what they choose to say or see.
The notion that some content is so harmful as to render its transmis-
sion, and even reception, actionable—true for certain categories of
both intellectual property and pornographic material—means that
certain clicks on a mouse can subject a user to intense sanctions. Con-
sumers of information in traditional media are alerted to the poten-
tial illegality of particular content by its very rarity; if a magazine or
CD is available in a retail store its contents are likely legal to possess.
The Internet severs much of that signaling, and the ease with which
one can execute an Internet search and encounter illegal content.
puts users in a vulnerable position. Perhaps the implementation of
destination ISP-based filtering, if pressed, could be coupled with im-
munity for users for most categories of that which they can get to on-
line in the natural course of surfing.
The most worrisome outcome is one in which filtering creeps
into the system in an ad hoc way, without formal evaluation of the
standards by which it is taking place or the criteria by which ISPs
choose to accede to such filtering when the requests are informal, or
an ability to fully evaluate the nature of the sites filtered. To have
sources of Internet content simply disappear from the perspective of
others—at first for some rather than all—portends enormous but sub-
tle control over who can say what on a formerly free-for-all medium.
The Internet's brilliant methodology of data routing—a flexible set of
intermediaries functioning in tandem yet with little central coordina-
tion—offers multiple opportunities for control that are only now com-
ing into focus for regulators. Such control cannot be accepted, even if
initiated for substantively good intentions, without the most exacting
of processes to avoid abuse, including a comprehensive framework
where sovereigns' actions to block material are thoroughly docu-
mented and open to challenge. If carefully implemented and circum-
scribed, however, government mandated destination-based filtering
stands the greatest chance of approximating the legal and practical
frameworks by which sovereigns currently sanction illegal content
apart from the Internet. Attention to distinct points of control, then,
can force cyber-libertarians to dispense with procedural or jurisdic-
tional concerns about regulation and instead either to rely flatly on
theories of free speech and action that go beyond even the most lib-
eral governments' current allowances, or to invoke Internet excep-
tionalism to explain why it should be indeed freer than its analog me-
dia counterparts.
